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Abstract
In this paper, we initiate the systematic study of solving linear programs under differential
privacy. The first step is simply to define the problem: to this end, we introduce several natural
classes of private linear programs that capture different ways sensitive data can be incorporated
into a linear program. For each class of linear programs we give an efficient, differentially private
solver based on the multiplicative weights framework, or we give an impossibility result.
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1 Introduction
Linear programming is one of the most fundamental and powerful tools in algorithmic design. It
is used ubiquitously throughout computer science: applications include maximum matching, maxi-
mum and minimum cost flow, and fractional packing and covering problems. Linear programming
relaxations of NP-complete problems also underlie countless efficient approximation algorithms.
At the same time, differential privacy is a field where efficient algorithms have been difficult
to find. For many problems in differential privacy, the initial focus was on understanding the
information-theoretic complexity—the extent to which solving the problem, efficiently or not, is
compatible with differential privacy. As a result, there are many central problems that are known
to be privately solvable, but for which computationally efficient algorithms are not known. For
example, Kasiviswanathan et al. [19] show how to privately PAC learn any PAC learnable concept
class (without privacy) with only a small increase in the sample complexity, but via an exponential
time algorithm. It remains open whether a computationally efficient algorithm can do this in
general. Similarly, Blum et al. [4] show how to privately release a summary of a private database
that approximately preserves the answers to rich families of linear queries, again via an exponential
time algorithm. In fact, under standard cryptographic assumptions, it is not possible to efficiently
and privately answer large collections of general linear queries [10, 28, 27].
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The two preceding examples are among the many algorithms that use the extremely general
exponential mechanism of McSherry and Talwar [23] to achieve near optimal error. However, the
exponential mechanism is not efficient in general: it requires running time linear in the size of its
output range, which can be extremely large. In contrast, general tools for designing efficient differ-
entially private algorithms are harder to come by (although not non-existent, e.g., the sample and
aggregate framework [24] and output/objective perturbation for unconstrained convex optimization
[6, 21]).
Our work contributes to the toolbox of general algorithmic techniques for designing computa-
tionally efficient and differentially private algorithms; specifically, we give tools to privately and
efficiently solve linear programs (LPs) of various types. An initial problem is to simply define
what it means to solve a linear program privately. Differential privacy is defined in terms of neigh-
boring databases. A database is a collection of records from some domain and two databases are
neighboring if they differ in a single record. Differential privacy requires the output distribution
of an algorithm to be nearly identical when run on either of a pair of neighboring databases. If
linear programs can depend on private databases, we naturally have a notion of neighboring linear
programs, and we want an algorithm for solving these linear programs that is differentially private
with respect to this notion of neighboring inputs.
The way in which the linear program is derived from the database gives rise to several distinct
notions of neighboring linear programs. For instance, consider an LP with objective c⊤x and
constraints Ax ≤ b, where moving to a neighboring LP neighboring database leaves c and A
unchanged but perturbs b by only a small amount in each coordinate. Solving this kind of linear
programming privately is similar to the well-studied linear query release problem in differential
privacy, and techniques for linear query release—such as the private multiplicative weights algorithm
of Hardt and Rothblum [15] (and its offline variants [14, 16])—can be adapted with minor changes.
(This result may even be considered folklore.) On the other hand, the situation is qualitatively
different if moving to a neighboring LP can change either the constraint matrix A or the objective
vector c. Some of these private LPs can still be solved; others are provably impossible to solve to
nontrivial accuracy under differential privacy.
In this paper, we develop a taxonomy of private LPs. For each class, we either present an
efficient and accurate differentially private solver, or prove that general LPs of this type cannot be
accurately solved while preserving privacy.
1.1 Our Results and Techniques
We consider linear programs LP (D) defined by a database D, with form
max
x∈Rd+
c⊤x
s.t. Ax ≤ b.
Here, the vector x represents the variables of the linear program, and c = c(D), A = A(D), and
b = b(D) may each depend on the private database D. Our goal is to find an approximate solution
to LP (D) in a sense to be defined, while ensuring differential privacy for the underlying database
D.
We classify private LPs along two dimensions: which part of the LP depends on the database
and how sensitive the LP is to changes in the database. Along the second axis, we will consider: 1)
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low-sensitivity LPs, where changing one record of the database induces a small difference between
coefficients that vanishes as the size of the database n grows and 2) high-sensitivity LPs, where
changing one record of the database can induce a potentially large change in some coefficient. Low-
sensitivity LPs are natural when the coefficients of the LP represent some kind of average over the
database, whereas high-sensitivity LPs are natural when the coefficients represent specific records
of the database.
Furthermore, we consider four parts of the LP that might depend on the database: 1) the rows
of A, 2) the scalars b, 3) the columns of A, and 4) the objective c. These four parts of the LP,
combined with the two notions of sensitivity, lead to the following eight notions of private linear
programming:
1. The constraints: For these linear programs, moving to a neighboring database can affect
at most one row of A and the corresponding entry of b, which corresponds to changing one
constraint of the LP.
(a) High-sensitivity: For high-sensitivity constraint private LPs (Section 3), moving to
a neighboring database can change a single constraint arbitrarily. That is, for every
pair of neighboring databases D,D′, there exists a row i such that for every row j 6= i,
A(D)j = A(D
′)j and b(D)j = b(D
′)j . This kind of linear program arises, for example,
in covering LPs in which each record of the database represents an individual that needs
to be covered. We cannot hope to approximately satisfy every constraint while ensuring
privacy,1 but we show that by using a variant of multiplicative weights that operates
only over a restricted set of distributions, we can still find solutions to such LPs that
approximately satisfy most of the constraints. As an example of our technique, we solve
a private version of the fractional set cover problem.
(b) Low-sensitivity: For low-sensitivity constraint private LPs (Section 4.3), moving to a
neighboring database can change a single row of A by a small amount in each entry—
for some row i, ‖Ai(D) − Ai(D′)‖∞ ≤ 1/n. We show how to solve these LPs using
multiplicative weights; our techniques work equally well if the entire constraint matrix
can change on neighboring problems (we will sometimes call these low-sensitivity matrix
or row private LPs).
2. The scalars: For these linear programs, c and A are fixed and moving to a neighboring
database only affects b = b(D).
(a) High-sensitivity: For high-sensitivity scalar private LPs, for every neighboring D,D′,
there is a row i such that for every j 6= i, b(D)j = b(D′)j . We show that in general, such
LPs cannot be solved privately.
(b) Low-sensitivity: For low-sensitivity scalar private LPs, moving to a neighboring database
can change every entry in b slightly, such that ‖b(D)− b(D′)‖∞ ≤ 1/n. These LPs cap-
ture the private linear query release problem, so we will sometimes refer to them as
query release LPs. In this problem, the database is viewed as a histogram D ∈ Nd+ and
1For example, given a solution x to LP (D), we can always derive a new constraint (Ai, bi) that is far from being
satisfied by x. If we introduce this new constraint in a neighboring linear program LP (D′), by the differential privacy
condition, this new constraint must also be far from being satisfied in LP (D′) with high probability.
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the objective is to find a synthetic database x ∈ Rd+ such that for every linear query q in
some family, 〈q, x〉 ≈ 〈q,D〉. We show how to adapt existing techniques for this problem
and derive resulting accurate solvers for LPs of this form (Section 4.2).
3. One column in A: For these linear programs, moving to a neighboring database can affect
at most one column of A.
These LPs arise literally as the dual linear programs of row private LPs. For example, in a
LP where variables represent different tasks, the private coefficients corresponding to a single
variable may represent the amount of resources needed for that task. Then, a packing LP
seeks to maximize some objective subject to resource constraints.
(a) High-sensitivity: For high-sensitivity column private LPs, for every neighboringD,D′,
the matrices A(D), A(D′) are arbitrarily different in a single column, and identical in
all other columns. We show that in general, such LPs cannot be solved privately (Sec-
tion 5.3).
(b) Low-sensitivity: For low-sensitivity column private LPs, moving to a neighboring
database can change every entry in a single column of A by a small amount. More
generally, if Ai is the ith row of A, then ‖A(D)i −A(D′)i‖1 ≤ 1/n for each i. We show
how to use these LPs using multiplicative weights (Section 4.4).
4. The objective: For these linear programs, moving to a neighboring database can affect the
objective c. The scalars b and constraints A remain unchanged.
(a) High-sensitivity: For high-sensitivity objective private LPs, for every neighboring
D,D′, a single entry of the objective c(D), c(D′) can change arbitrarily. We show that
in general, such LPs cannot be solved privately (Section 5.2).
(b) Low-sensitivity: For low-sensitivity objective private LPs, for every neighboring D,D′,
the objective vectors c(D), c(D′) satisfy ‖c(D) − c(D′)‖1 ≤ 1/n. This kind of linear
program can be solved inefficiently to high accuracy by selecting from the set of vertices
of the feasible polytope with the exponential mechanism; we show that linear programs
in this class can also be solved efficiently and accurately, by directly using randomized
response (Section 4.5).
This taxonomy is summarized in Table 1. We will formally define accuracy, but roughly speak-
ing, an accurate solution satisfies each constraint to within additive α, and has objective within
additive α of optimal (when there is an objective). The exception is constraint privacy (indicated
by the asterisk), where our algorithm finds a solution that satisfies only most of the constraints to
within additive α, and may violate the other constraints arbitrarily.
1.2 Related Work
Differential privacy emerged from a line of work initiated by Dinur and Nissim [7], was defined by
Dwork et al. [9], and is now a standard definition of privacy in computer science. Below, we discuss
relevant results in differential privacy; the survey by Dwork [8] is an excellent source for a more
comprehensive overview.
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Location of change High sensitivity Low sensitivity
Objective c No (Section 5) Yes (Section 4.5)
Scalar b No (Section 5) Yes (Folklore, Section 4.2)
Row/All of A Yes* (Section 3) Yes (Section 4.4)
Column of A No (Section 5) Yes (Section 4.4)
Table 1: Efficient and accurate solvability
Private optimization has been studied since the work of Blum et al. [3] and Kasiviswanathan
et al. [19], who considered how to choose an optimal classifier privately. Blum et al. [3] give
an efficient reduction from SQ learning to private SQ learning, and Kasiviswanathan et al. [19]
give a very general but inefficient reduction from PAC learning to private PAC learning using the
exponential mechanism of McSherry and Talwar [23]. Private learning was placed explicitly into
an optimization framework by Chaudhuri et al. [6], who give two techniques for privately solving
certain unconstrained convex optimization problems. Gupta et al. [12] give several algorithms for
problems in private combinatorial optimization, but these were specialized combinatorial algorithms
for specific problems.
In parallel, a line of work initiated by Blum et al. [4] and continuing with Dwork et al. [10], Roth
and Roughgarden [26], Dwork et al. [11], Hardt and Rothblum [15], Gupta et al. [14], Hardt et al.
[16] study the problem of privately producing synthetic data consistent with some private database
on many linear queries. (Of particular note is the private multiplicative weights mechanism of
Hardt and Rothblum [15], which achieves the optimal accuracy and running time bounds [27, 5].)
This problem can be represented as a linear program with queries defining constraints, and indeed,
the private multiplicative weights algorithm of Hardt and Rothblum [15] can be directly applied to
solve this kind of linear program. This observation motivates our current investigation.
Our algorithms are mostly based on different variants of the multiplicative weights method of
solving linear programs, which was introduced by Plotkin et al. [25] (see the excellent survey by
Arora et al. [2] for more details). Whereas Plotkin et al. [25] maintain a distribution over the dual
variables with multiplicative weights, depending on the kind of linear program we are solving, we
either maintain a distribution over the dual variables or the primal variables. To solve constraint
private LPs, we use a combination of the multiplicative weights update method and Bregman
projections [2]—Hsu et al. [18] use a similar version of this technique in designing analyst private
mechanisms.
2 Differential Privacy Preliminaries
Differential privacy is a strong notion of privacy, first introduced by Dwork et al. [9]. In the typical
setting, we consider a database as a multisets of records, each belonging to a single individual.
Then, a randomized function from databases to an output range satisfies differential privacy if, for
any change in a single record of the input database, the distribution on outputs remains roughly
the same. More formally, we have the following definition.
Definition 1 (Dwork et al. [9]). Let ǫ > 0 and 0 ≤ δ < 1 be given. A randomized function
M : D → R mapping databases to an output range is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private if for every subset
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S ⊆ R and for every pair of database D,D′ that differ in a single record,
Pr[M(D) ∈ S] ≤ eǫ Pr[M(D′) ∈ S] + δ.
When δ = 0, we will say that M is ǫ-differentially private.
We will use two basic mechanisms from differential privacy: the Laplace mechanism and the
exponential mechanism. The Laplace mechanism privately releases a number by adding noise drawn
from the Laplace distribution.
Definition 2 (Dwork et al. [9]). Let ǫ > 0 be given. A function f : D → R is ∆-sensitive if for
every pair of database D,D′ that differ in a single record,
|f(D)− f(D′)| ≤ ∆.
The Laplace mechanism applied to a ∆-sensitive function releases
f(D) + ν,
where ν is a draw from the Laplace distribution with parameter ǫ/∆; that is, with probability
density function
F (ν) =
ǫ
2∆
exp
(
−|ν|ǫ
∆
)
.
The Laplace mechanism is ǫ-differentially private and satisfies the following tail bound, which
is also an accuracy guarantee for the Laplace mechanism.
Lemma 3. Let β ∈ (0, 1) be given, and let ν be drawn from the Laplace distribution with scale b.
Then,
Pr[|ν| ≥ T ] ≤ β for T = 1
b
log(1/β).
We will also use the exponential mechanism [23], which can privately produce a non-numeric
or discrete output. The exponential mechanism is defined in terms of a quality score that maps a
database and an element of the range to a real valued score. For a given a database, the exponential
mechanism privately outputs an element of the range that approximately maximizes the quality
score.
Definition 4 (McSherry and Talwar [23]). Let ǫ > 0 be given, and suppose the quality score
Q : R×D → R is ∆-sensitive in the database. On database D, the ǫ-private exponential mechanism
with quality score Q outputs r ∈ R with probability proportional to
exp
( ǫ
2∆
·Q(r,D)
)
.
The exponential mechanism is ǫ-differentially private, and satisfies the following accuracy guar-
antee.
Theorem 5 (McSherry and Talwar [23]). Let β ∈ (0, 1) and the database D be given. Suppose that
the maximum value of the quality score Q on database D is OPT. Then, the ǫ-private exponential
mechanism with quality score Q on D outputs r ∈ R such that
Pr
[
Q(r,D) ≥ OPT−2∆
ǫ
log
( |R|
β
)]
≥ 1− β.
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To combine these mechanisms, we will use standard composition theorems.
Theorem 6 (Dwork et al. [11]). For any δ ∈ (0, 1), the composition of k (adaptively chosen)
ǫ′-private mechanisms is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private, for
ǫ′ =
ǫ√
8k log(1/δ)
.
3 Constraint Private LPs
Let us begin by considering constraint private LPs, with the general form
max
x∈K
c⊤x
s.t. Ax ≤ b,
where A ∈ Rm×d, b ∈ Rm, c ∈ Rd, and K ⊆ Rd. We think of K as the easy constraints, those that
are independent of the database, like non-negativity.
Let KOPT = K ∩ {x ∈ Rd | c⊤x = OPT}. Then, the original LP can be solved approximately
by repeatedly solving the feasibility problem
find x ∈ KOPT
s.t. Ax ≤ b,
binary searching on the optimal objective value OPT.2 Thus, unless we specify otherwise, we will
restrict our attention to feasibility LPs. Furthermore, since a linear program has a convex feasible
region, K (and hence KOPT) are convex. From now on, we will write K for KOPT.
Roughly, a private database D defines a linear program with objective vector c(D), constraint
matrix A(D), and vector b(D), which we will call the scalars. In a constraint private LP, the
objective c(D) = c(D′) is independent of the data and for every two neighboring datasets D,D′,
the matrices A(D) and A(D′) are exactly the same, except one matrix has an additional row
that the other does not. The vectors b(D) and b(D′) are also identical, except there is an entry
corresponding to the different constraint in A in one b, but not the other. Then, we want a LP solver
that satisfies the differential privacy guarantee with respect to this notion of adjacency. Formally:
Definition 7. A randomized algorithm M with inputs m ∈ N, vector b ∈ Rm, and matrix A ∈
Rm×d and outputting a vector in Rd is (ǫ, δ)-high sensitivity constraint private if for any A,A′ such
that A′ is equal to A with an additional row appended, and b, b′ such that b′ is equal to b with an
additional entry,
Pr[M(m, b,A) ∈ S] ≤ eǫ Pr[M(m+ 1, b′, A′) ∈ S] + δ
for any set S ⊆ Rd.
2Binary search will incur an additional overhead in privacy, but in some situations may not be necessary: for
instance, if a bound on the sensitivity of the optimal objective is known, we can solve the LP non-privately and
estimate OPT with the Laplace mechanism.
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3.1 Solving LPs with Dense Multiplicative Weights
A standard approach to solving LPs is via no-regret algorithms. For a brief summary, these algo-
rithms operate over a series of timesteps, selecting a single action at each step. Once the action is
selected, the loss for each action is revealed (perhaps adversarially); the no-regret algorithm then
adjusts to favor actions with less loss. While LPs can be solved using any no-regret algorithm, for
concreteness we use the multiplicative weights update algorithm.
Throughout, we will use calligraphic letters (A) to denote sets of actions, Roman letters (A) to
denote measures on those actions A : A → [0, 1], and letters with tildes (A˜) to denote a probability
distributions over actions. We will write |A| to mean the density of measure A, defined to be∑
a∈AAa.
We will use a variant of the standard multiplicative weights algorithm that maintains a dense
distribution over the set of constraints, i.e., a distribution that doesn’t place too much probability on
any action. We will call this algorithm, due to Herbster and Warmuth [17], the dense multiplicative
weights algorithm (Algorithm 1). Roughly, the algorithm projects the MW distribution on actions
into the set of dense distributions at each step. The loss at each step will be defined by a point
that approximately satisfies the average constraint weighted by the MW distribution—by capping
the probability on any constraint, we ensure that this point can be selected privately even when a
single constraint can change arbitrarily on neighboring instances.
We first define this projection step, also known as a Bregman projection.
Definition 8. Let s > 0. Given a measure A such that |A| ≤ s, let ΓsA be the (Bregman)
projection of A into the set of 1/s-dense distributions, defined by ΓsAa =
1
s ·min{1, cAa} for every
a ∈ A, where c ≥ 0 is such that s =∑a∈Amin{1, cAa}.
Then, we can define the Dense Multiplicative Weights algorithm, which uses the standard multi-
plicative weights update rule combined with a Bregman projection into the set of dense distributions
after each step.
Algorithm 1 The Dense Multiplicative Weights algorithm, DMWs,η
Let A1 be the uniform measure on A
For t = 1, 2, . . . , T :
Let B˜t = ΓsA
t
Receive loss vector ℓt (may depend on B1, . . . , Bt)
Update: For each a ∈ A:
Update At+1a = e
−ηℓtaAta
Then, dense multiplicative weights satisfies the following (regret) guarantee.3
Theorem 9 (Herbster and Warmuth [17]). Let A1 be the uniform measure of density 1 and let{
B˜t
}
be the sequence of projected distributions obtained by DMWs,η with arbitrary losses
{
ℓt
}
satisfying ‖ℓt‖∞ ≤ 1 and η ≤ 1/2. Let B˜∗ be the uniform distribution on some subset S∗ ⊆ A of
3Note that the regret guarantee is only with respect to dense distributions, rather than arbitrary distributions.
This is a result of projecting the MW distribution to a dense distribution—the algorithm may not be able to compete
with non-dense distributions.
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size s. Then,
1
T
T∑
i=1
〈ℓt, B˜t〉 ≤ 1
T
T∑
i=1
〈ℓt, B˜∗〉+ η + log |A|
ηT
.
Recall we can assume that we know the optimal value OPT, so the objective can be represented
as the constraint c⊤x = OPT. Hence, let K = {x ∈ Rd+ | c⊤x = OPT} be the public feasible set.
We will assume that there is a known, data-independent upper bound ρ such that
ρ ≥ max
D
max
x∈K
‖A(D)x − b(D)‖∞,
which we call the width of the LP.
We will define our algorithm in terms of an approximate oracle for solving a linear minization
problem. (For a concrete example of such an oracle in the context of fractional set cover, see the
next section.)
Definition 10. An (α, β)-approximate, ρ-bounded oracle, given a distribution y ∈ Rm and matrix
A ∈ Rm×d, with probability at least 1− β finds x∗ ∈ Rd with
m∑
i=1
yi(Ai · x∗) ≤ min
x∈K
m∑
i=1
yi(Ai · x) + α
and ‖Ax∗ − b‖∞ ≤ ρ.
To solve linear programs, we use the dense multiplicative weights algorithm to maintain a dis-
tribution over the constraints, and pick points xt ∈ K that best satisfy the weighted combination of
constraints at each step. Intuitively, the losses will lead to more weight on violated constraints, lead-
ing to points that are more feasible. Taking the average of the points xt will yield an approximately
feasible point, if it exists. See Algorithm 2 for the full algorithm.
We note that similar techniques for solving linear programs using multiplicative weights have
been known since at least Plotkin et al. [25]; the novelty in our approach is that we use multiplicative
weights paired with a projection onto the set of dense distributions, and show that the solution
approximately satisfies most of the constraints. As we will see, the projection step is needed for
privacy.
Theorem 11. Let 0 < α ≤ 9ρ, and let β ∈ (0, 1). Suppose there is a feasible solution of the
linear program. Then with probability at least 1 − β, Algorithm 2 with density parameter s run
with an (α/3, β/T )-approximate, ρ-bounded oracle finds a point x∗ in K such that there is a set of
constraints S of size at most |S| < s, with Aix∗ ≤ bi + α for every i /∈ S.
Proof. By a union bound over T steps, the oracle succeeds on all steps with probability at least
1− β; condition on this event.
Let Ks = {y ∈ Rm | 1⊤y, ‖y‖∞ ≤ 1/s} be the set of 1/s-dense distributions. Then, y⊤Ax∗ ≤
y⊤b for any y ∈ Ks, so in particular the oracle finds xt with y⊤Axt < y⊤b+ α/3.
Thus, the loss vectors ℓt = (1/2ρ)(b − Axt) + 1/2 satisfy ℓt · yt ≥ 1/2 − α/6ρ, which is at least
−1 if α ≤ 9ρ. Since the oracle is ρ-bounded, ℓt · yt ≤ 1. So, Theorem 9 applies; for p any point in
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Algorithm 2 Solving for LP feasibility with dense multiplicative weights
Input A ∈ Rm×d, b ∈ Rm.
Let y˜1 be the uniform distribution in Rm, ρ ≥ maxx∈K ‖Ax− b‖∞ be the width of the LP, s ∈ N
be the density parameter, and α > 0 be the desired accuracy. Let Oracle be an (α, β)-accurate,
ρ-bounded oracle, and set
η =
√
logm
T
, T =
36ρ2 logm
α2
.
For t = 1, . . . , T :
Find xt = Oracle(y˜t, A)
Compute losses ℓti := (1/2ρ)(bi −Ai · xt) + 1/2.
Update y˜t+1 from y˜t and ℓt via dense multiplicative weights with density s.
Output x = (1/T )
∑T
t=1 x
t.
Ks, we have the following bound:
1
2
− α
6ρ
≤ 1
T
T∑
t=1
(
ℓt · p)+ η + logm
ηT
=
1
T
T∑
t=1
(
1
2ρ
(
b−Axt)+ 1
2
)
· p+ η + logm
ηT
Thus,
− α
6ρ
≤ 1
T
T∑
t=1
1
2ρ
(
b−Axt) · p+ η + logm
ηT
.
Define x = (1/T )
∑T
t=1 x
t, and rearrange:
p⊤Ax ≤ p⊤b+ 2ρη + 2ρ logm
ηT
+
α
3
.
By our choice of η and T , we get
p⊤Ax ≤ p⊤b+ α.
Since this holds for any p ∈ Ks, x satisfies all but s−1 constraints with error α—if it didn’t, letting
p be the uniform distribution on the s violated constraints would give a contradiction.
3.2 Achieving Constraint Privacy
Now, we will see how to make Algorithm 2 constraint private. First, the output point depends
on the private data (the constraints A) only through the minimization step. Thus, if we can
make the minimization private (in a certain sense), then each xt (and hence the final point x) will
satisfy constraint privacy. Note that if the oracle privately minimizes over K, the final point x will
automatically be in K since K is convex. Hence, we can also think of K as the public constraints,
the ones that are always satisfied.
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Theorem 12. Let ǫ, δ, T > 0, and let
ǫ′ =
ǫ√
8T log(1/δ)
.
with density parameter s ∈ N. Suppose the oracle is ǫ′-private, where on neighboring instances the
inputs (distributions) y˜, y˜′ satisfy
‖y˜‖∞ ≤ 1/s, ‖y˜′‖∞ ≤ 1/s, ‖y˜ − y˜′‖1 ≤ 2/s,
and the matrices A,A′ are exactly the same except one has an additional row, and the vectors b, b′
except one has a corresponding additional entry. Then, Algorithm 2 with density s is (ǫ, δ)-high
sensitivity constraint private.
Proof. If the oracle is ǫ′-differentially private, then (ǫ, δ)-constraint privacy for the whole algorithm
follows directly by composition (Theorem 6).
To show that the oracle is private when adding or removing a constraint from the LP, we know
that A,A′ are exactly the same except one has an extra row, and we know that ‖y˜‖∞ ≤ 1/s since
we have projected into the set Ks. Hence, it only remains to check that neighboring y˜, y˜′ satisfy
‖y˜ − y˜′‖1 ≤ 2/s for each timestep t. We use a result about the sensitivity of Bregman projections
from from Hsu et al. [18]; we reproduce the proof for completeness.
Lemma 13 (Hsu et al. [18]). Let s > 0 be given. Suppose A,A′ be measures on sets A,A ∪ a′
respectively, and identical on A. If A˜, A˜′ are the respective Bregman projections into the set of
1/s-dense distributions, then
‖A˜− A˜′‖1 ≤ 2/s.
Here and below, we treat A,A′ as supported on the same set with Aa′ fixed at 0.
Proof. From the definition of the projection (Definition 8), it’s clear that sA˜a ≥ sA˜′a for all a 6= a′.
We then have the following:∑
a∈A∪a′
|sA˜a − sA˜′a| = |sA˜a′ − sA˜′a′ |+
∑
a6=a′
|sA˜a − sA˜′a|
≤ 1 +
∑
a6=a′
|sA˜a − sA˜′a|
= 1 +
∑
a6=a′
sA˜a − sA˜′a
= 1 + s|A˜′| − s(|A˜′| − A˜′a′)
≤ 1 + s− (s− 1) = 2
Dividing through by s, we are done.
Since y, y′ are identical except for the weight corresponding to the differing constraint, we are
done by the lemma.
Now that we have presented our algorithm for solving LPs under constraint privacy, we give an
example of how to instantiate the oracle and apply Theorem 11.
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3.3 Private Fractional Set Cover
We will consider the example of the fractional set cover LP, though our arguments extend to
constraint private LPs with a private oracle that has low width. (For example, many covering and
packing LPs satisfy this property.)
Suppose there are d sets, each covering some subset of m people. Each set has a cost cS , and
we wish to select the cheapest collection of sets that covers every person. We will consider the
fractional relaxation of this problem, where instead of selecting whole sets for the cover, we can
decide to select a fraction of each set, i.e., each set can be chosen to some non-negative degree, and
the cost for set S is the degree to which it is open times cS . We again want the cheapest fractional
collection of sets, such that at least weight 1 covers each person.4
To formulate this as a linear program, let the variables be x ∈ Rd+; variable xS will be the
degree that we choose set S in the cover. For the constraints, let Ai ∈ {0, 1}m such that AiS is 1
exactly when set S covers i, otherwise 0.
We will assume that the optimal value OPT is known, and the goal is to compute an approximate
fractional set covering x∗ corresponding to OPT. This is equivalent to solving the following linear
program:
find: x ∈ K
s.t. Ai · x ≥ 1 for each i
where K = {x ∈ Rd+ | c · x = OPT} is the feasible region.
We wish to achieve constraint privacy: if each individual corresponds to a covering constraint,
then we want an approximate solution that is hides whether a person i needs to be covered or not.
This is not always possible—if each set contains just one person, then the presence of a set in any
valid covering will reveal information about the people that need to be covered. Thus, we will find
a solution violating a few constraints, so only covering most people.
To use our constraint private LP solver, we first define a private oracle solving the minimization
problem
O(y) = argmin
x∈K
∑
i
yi(Ai · x).
Since the oracle is minimizing a linear function, the optimal point lies at a vertex of K and is of
the form
x∗ =
OPT
ci
ei
for some i, where ei is the i’th standard basis vector, i.e., all zeros except for a 1 in the i’th
coordinate. We can use the exponential mechanism to privately select this vertex.
Lemma 14. Let γ ∈ (0, 1) be given. Suppose ‖y‖∞ ≤ 1/s, and suppose that ‖y − y′‖∞ ≤ 2/s
on adjacent inputs. Let O(y) be the ǫ-private exponential mechanism over the vertices of K with
quality score
Q(j, y) =
∑
i
yi
(
Ai · OPT
cj
ej − 1
)
=
OPT
cj
∑
i
yiaij − 1.
4To highlight the constraint private LP, we will only consider the fractional version. It is also possible to round
the fractional solution to an integral solution (with slightly worse cost), since randomized rounding is independent of
the private data.
13
Then O is an (α, γ)-approximate, ρ-bounded oracle, with
ρ =
OPT
cmin
− 1 and α = 6OPT log d log(1/γ)
cmin · s · ǫ .
Proof. The width of the oracle is clear: when returning a point x = OPTci ei,
Ai · x− 1 ≤ OPT
cmin
− 1.
For accuracy, note that the quality score Q has sensitivity at most
∆ =
3OPT
cmin · s.
Why? On neighboring databases, there are two possible changes: first we may have |yi− y′i| ≤ 2/s,
and second we may have an extra term in the sum on one neighbor (since the sum is taken over
all constraints, and one neighboring instance has an extra constraint). The first source contributes
sensitivity 2OPT /(cmins), and since ‖y‖∞, ‖y′‖∞ ≤ 1/s, the second source contributes sensitivity
OPT /(cmins).
Now, since there are d possible outputs, the accuracy guarantee for the exponential mechanism
(Theorem 5) shows that O selects a point with additive error at most
α =
2∆
ǫ
log d log(1/γ) =
6OPT
cminsǫ
log d log(1/γ)
with probability at least 1− γ. Hence, we are done.
Now, it follows that Algorithm 2 solves the private fractional set cover problem with the following
accuracy guarantee.
Theorem 15. Let β ∈ (0, 1). With probability at least 1 − β, Algorithm 2 with the exponential
mechanism as an oracle (Lemma 14)—where ρ is the width of the oracle and α ≤ 9ρ—finds a point
x∗ such that Aix
∗ ≥ 1− α except for at most s constraints i, where
s = O˜
(
OPT2 log d log1/2m log(1/β) log1/2(1/δ)
c2 · α2 · ǫ
)
.
Algorithm 2 is also ǫ-high sensitivity constraint private.
Proof. Let ǫ′ be as in Theorem 12, and let γ = β/T with T as in Algorithm 2. Unfolding the
definition of ǫ′ and ρ and applying Lemma 14, the oracle gives accuracy
6OPT
cminsǫ′
log d log(1/γ) =
96
√
2OPT2 log d log1/2m log(1/γ) log1/2(1/δ)
c2minǫsα
with probability at least 1 − γ. Set this equal to α/3. By assumption α ≤ 9ρ, so Theorem 11
applies: with probability at least 1− β, there is a set S of at most s constraints such Aix∗ ≥ 1−α
for every i /∈ S, where
s = O
(
OPT2 log d log1/2m log(1/γ) log1/2(1/δ)
c2 · α2 · ǫ
)
.
and γ = β/T .
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Remark 16. A variant of the efficient private set cover problem has been investigated by Gupta
et al. [12]. Our techniques are more general, but the solution we provide here has an imcompa-
rable accuracy guarantee. We include this example to demonstrate how to use Algorithm 2 and
Theorem 11. On the one hand, we may fail to satisfy some of the coverage constraints, and if we
imagine that each uncovered element can be covered at a cost of 1, our approximation guarantee
now depends on OPT unlike the guarantee of Gupta et al. [12].
On the other hand, we output an explicit solution whereas the algorithm of Gupta et al. [12]
outputs an implicit solution, a “set of instructions” that describes a set cover when paired with the
private data. (Their approach can also be interpreted as satisfying the weaker guarantee of joint
differential privacy [20] rather than standard differential privacy.) Finally, our techniques apply to
general constraint-private linear programs, not just set cover.
4 Low-Sensitivity LPs
Let us now turn to low-sensitivity LPs. Recall that for these LPs, the distance between adjacent
inputs decreases as the size of the database (i.e., the number of individuals) grows. First, a few
simplifying assumptions. Like above, we will continue to solve feasibility LPs of the following form:
find x ∈ Rd+
s.t. Ax ≤ b
Unlike the case for general constraint private LPs, we require that the feasible solution is a distri-
bution, i.e., is non-negative and has ℓ1 norm 1. Note that if the optimal solution has ℓ1 norm L,
then the rescaled LP
find x ∈ Rd+
s.t. Ax ≤ b/L
has a distribution as a solution. Our algorithms will find a point x∗ such that Ax∗ ≤ b/L + α · 1,
so if we set α = α′/L, then A(Lx∗) ≤ b+α′ gives an approximate solution to the original, unscaled
LP.
4.1 Solving LPs with Multiplicative Weights
Before getting into specific kinds of low-sensitivity LPs, we first review another standard method
for solving LPs via the standard multiplicative weights algorithm presented in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 The Multiplicative Weights Algorithm, MWη
Let A˜1 be the uniform distribution on A
For t = 1, 2, . . . , T :
Receive loss vector ℓt (may depend on A1, . . . , At)
For each a ∈ A:
Update At+1a = e
−ηℓtaA˜ta for every a ∈ A
Normalize A˜t+1 = At+1/|At+1|
15
Unlike the dense multiplicative weights approach presented earlier (Algorithm 2), we use mul-
tiplicative weights to maintain a distribution over the variables rather than the constraints.5 This
distribution will be the candidate solution, and we define losses by the maximum constraint vio-
lation of this candidate solution at each step. It will be useful to first define an oracle for linear
maximizations.
Definition 17. For ǫ > 0, γ > 0 an (α, γ)-dual oracle, given A, b, x as input, finds a constraint
i ∈ [m] such that
Aix− bi ≥ max
j
Ajx− bj − α,
with probability at least 1− γ.
We now give the full algorithm in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 Solving for LP feasibility with primal multiplicative weights
Input A ∈ Rm×d, b ∈ Rm.
Let x˜1 be the uniform distribution in Rd, ρ = maxij |Aij | be the width of the LP, α > 0 be the
desired accuracy. Let Oracle be a (α, γ)-dual oracle, and set
η =
√
log d
T
, T =
9ρ2 log d
α2
.
For t = 1, . . . , T :
Find pt = Oracle(A, b, x˜t)
Compute losses ℓti := (1/ρ)Apti
Update x˜t+1 from x˜t and ℓt via multiplicative weights.
Output x = (1/T )
∑T
t=1 x˜
t
Then, the following accuracy guarantee is known.
Theorem 18 (Plotkin et al. [25]). Suppose there is a feasible distribution solution of the linear
program Ax ≤ b. Then, running Algorithm 4 with an (α/3, γ)-dual oracle finds a point x such that
Ax ≤ b+ α · 1 with probability at least 1− Tγ.
4.2 Scalar-Private LPs
First, we consider linear programs where the objective and constraint coefficients are public data,
but the right hand side in the constraints may contain private data. Roughly, a private database
D maps to an objective vector c(D), a constraint matrix A(D), and a vector b(D). For every pair
of neighboring databases D,D′, we have c(D) = c(D′) and A(D) = A(D′) independent of the data,
and ‖b(D)− b(D′)‖∞ ≤ ∆∞. We will think of ∆∞ as decreasing in n; our accuracy guarantees will
be trivial if this is not true. As usual, we will assume the LP is in feasibility form, and leave the
objective c implicit. Formally:
5Readers familiar with game theory may notice that we are solving LPs by finding the equilibrium of a two player,
zero-sum game. Then, Algorithm 2 is solving the game with MW over the constraints and best response over the
variables, while the approach we present in this section swaps the two roles.
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Definition 19. A randomized algorithmM with inputs vector b ∈ Rm and matrix A ∈ Rm×d, and
outputting a vector in Rd is (ǫ, δ)-low sensitivity scalar private with sensitivity ∆∞ if for any b, b
′
such that ‖b− b′‖∞ ≤ ∆∞,
Pr[M(b,A) ∈ S] ≤ eǫ Pr[M(b′, A′) ∈ S] + δ
for any set S ⊆ Rd.
The algorithm we use is a slight generalization of the offline private multiplicative weights
algorithm [13, 16] (building on the influential work of Hardt and Rothblum [15], who introduced
the “online” variant). In our framework, we will express the algorithm as a differentially private
variant of Algorithm 4 to solve these linear programs while preserving differential privacy.
Throughout, we assume that the vector b is private data. On neighboring databases, b can
change by at most ∆∞ in ℓ∞ norm. Looking at Algorithm 4, we see that the only place we touch
the private data is in the dual oracle. Accordingly, if the dual oracle is private in b, then the whole
algorithm is private.
Theorem 20. Let ǫ, δ, T be as in Algorithm 4, and let
ǫ′ =
ǫ√
8T log(1/δ)
.
Algorithm 4, run with an ǫ′-private dual oracle is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private.
Proof. Direct from composition (Theorem 6).
Just like in private multiplicative weights for private query release, the exponential mechanism
gives an appropriate dual oracle.
Lemma 21. Let ǫ, γ > 0 be given, and suppose the vector b can differ by at most ∆∞ in ℓ∞ norm
on neighboring instances. Then, the ǫ-private exponential mechanism with quality score
Q(i, b) = Aix− bi
is an (α, γ)-dual oracle, for
α =
2∆∞
ǫ
· log
(
m
γ
)
.
Proof. This is ǫ-private by definition, and the accuracy follows from the accuracy of the exponential
mechanism (Theorem 5)—the quality score is ∆∞-sensitive in b, and the output ranges over the
constraints, so has size m.
Combining the MW with the oracle, our private low-sensitivity scalar-private LP solver Algo-
rithm 4 satisfies the following accuracy guarantee.
Theorem 22. Let α, β ∈ (0, 1) be given. Suppose the linear program Ax ≤ b has a distribution as
a feasible solution. Algorithm 4, run with the exponential mechanism as a dual oracle (Lemma 21),
is (ǫ, δ)-low sensitiivty scalar private with sensitivity ∆∞, and finds x
∗ satisfying Ax∗ ≤ b+ α · 1,
with probability at least 1− β, where
α = O˜
(
ρ1/2∆
1/2
∞
ǫ1/2
· log1/4 d log1/4(1/δ) log1/2(1/β) log1/2m
)
.
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Proof. Let ǫ′ be as in Theorem 20, and let γ = β/T with T from Algorithm 4. By Lemma 21, the
ǫ′-private exponential mechanism with quality score
Q(i, b) = Aix− bi
is an (α/3, γ)-dual oracle for
α =
6∆∞
√
8T log(1/δ)
ǫ
· log
(
mT
β
)
=
18ρ∆∞
√
8 log d log(1/δ)
αǫ
· log
(
9ρ2(log d)m
α2β
)
.
Solving,
α = O˜
(
ρ1/2∆
1/2
∞
ǫ1/2
· log1/4 d log1/4(1/δ) log1/2(1/β) log1/2m
)
as desired.
Remark 23. This bound generalizes the guarantee for the private multiplicative weights algorithm
when privately generating synthetic data for linear queries [15]. In that setting, there is one variable
for each element in some underlying data universe X (and so d = |X |), and there is one equality
constraint for each of k linear queries (and so m = k).
Now, let us consider the low-sensitivity version of constraint privacy: neighboring instances
have constraint matrices that differ to a small degree. We distinguish two further subcases: either
every coefficient in each constraint can differ, or only a few coefficients in each constraint can differ.
4.3 Row/Matrix-Private LPs
Suppose we have the feasibility problem
find x
s.t. Ax ≤ b,
where some entries in A may change by at most ∆∞ on a neighboring instance.
Roughly, a private database D maps to an objective vector c(D), a constraint matrix A(D),
and a vector b(D). For every pair of neighboring databases D,D′, we have c(D) = c(D′) and
b(D) = b(D′) independent of the data, and ‖A(D) −A(D′)‖∞ ≤ ∆∞. Again, we will think of ∆∞
as decreasing in n; our accuracy guarantees will be trivial if this is not true. Our techniques work
equally well whether only a single row of A or the entire matrix A can differ, so we will assume the
latter. We will also assume that the LP is in feasibility form, and leave the objective c implicit.
Formally:
Definition 24. A randomized algorithmM with inputs vector b ∈ Rm and matrix A ∈ Rm×d, and
outputting a vector in Rd is (ǫ, δ)-low sensitivity row private with sensitivity ∆∞ if for any A,A
′
such that ‖A−A′‖∞ ≤ ∆∞,
Pr[M(b,A) ∈ S] ≤ eǫ Pr[M(b′, A′) ∈ S] + δ
for any set S ⊆ Rd.
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Algorithm 5 Row/matrix private LP solver
Input A ∈ [−1, 1]m×d, b ∈ Rm.
Let x˜1 be the uniform distribution in Rd, α > 0 be the desired accuracy, and ∆∞ be the sensitivity.
Let Oracle be a (α, γ)-dual oracle, and set
T =
144 log d
α2
, ǫ′ =
ǫ
4
√
dT log(1/δ)
, η =
√
log d
T
.
For t = 1, . . . , T :
Find pt = Oracle(A, b, x˜t).
Compute private losses ℓˆti :=
Apti+Lap(
∆∞
ǫ′
)
2 .
For each i, update xt+1i = e
−ηℓˆti · x˜ti.
Normalize x˜t+1 = xt+1/|xt+1|.
Output x = (1/T )
∑T
t=1 x˜
t.
We will normalize the problem so each entry in A is in [−1, 1].
The basic idea is to use multiplicative weights over the primal variables, with a dual oracle
selecting the most violated constraint—since the losses fed into the multiplicative weights algorithm
now depend on private data (the matrix A), we add Laplace noise to the loss vectors as they are
selected. The full algorithm is given in Algorithm 5.
We can now show privacy and accuracy for Algorithm 5.
Theorem 25. Let ǫ, ǫ′, δ,∆∞ be as in Algorithm 5. Algorithm 5 run with an ǫ
′-private dual oracle
is (ǫ, δ)-low sensitivity row private with sensitivity ∆∞.
Proof. Algorithm 5 performs dT Laplace operations, and T oracle operations. Each operation is
ǫ′-private, so this is at most 2dT ǫ′-private operations. By our choice of ǫ′ and Theorem 6, the
whole algorithm is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private.
We can show that the exponential mechanism is a private dual oracle.
Lemma 26. Let ǫ, γ > 0 be given, and suppose the matrix A can differ by at most ∆∞ in ℓ∞ norm
on neighboring instances. Let x be any distribution. Then, the ǫ-private exponential mechanism
with quality score
Q(i, b) = Aix− bi
is an (α, γ)-dual oracle, for
α =
2∆∞
ǫ
· log
(
m
γ
)
.
Proof. Since x is a distribution, the quality score is ∆∞-sensitive and accuracy follows from accuracy
of the exponential mechanism (Theorem 5).
While previously our accuracy theorems followed from standard accuracy results for solving
LPs using multiplicative weights, the proof for Algorithm 5 does not. Since the constraint matrix
is private, Algorithm 4 perturbs the losses and requires a more custom analysis. So, we will need
a standard regret bound for multiplicative weights.
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Theorem 27 (Littlestone and Warmuth [22]). Let
{
A˜t
}
be the distributions obtained by MWη
with arbitrary losses
{
ℓt
}
satisfying ‖ℓt‖∞ ≤ 1. Suppose that η ≤ 1/2. Let A∗ = 1a=a∗ , for some
a∗ ∈ A. Then,
T∑
t=1
〈ℓt, A˜t〉 ≤
T∑
t=1
〈ℓt, A∗〉+ η + log |A|
ηT
.
Then, we have the following accuracy guarantee.
Theorem 28. Let β > 0. Suppose the program has a distribution as a feasible solution. Then,
with probability at least 1 − β, Algorithm 5 run with the exponential mechanism as a dual oracle
(Lemma 26) finds a solution x∗ such that Ax∗ ≤ b+ α · 1, where
α = O˜
(
∆
1/2
∞ d1/4
ǫ1/2
· polylog
(
d,m,
1
β
,
1
δ
))
.
Proof. Let ǫ′ be as in Theorem 25, T be from Algorithm 5, and γ = β/2dT . By Lemma 26, with
probability at least 1/γ, the oracle’s choices satisfy
(
Ai · x˜t − bi
)− (Apt · x˜t − bpt) ≤ 2∆∞ǫ′ · log
(
m
γ
)
for all constraints i. Note that the left hand side is equal to
(
Ai · x˜t − bi
)− (ℓt · x˜t − bpt). Taking
a union bound over all T steps, this is true for all pt with probability at least 1− β/2d ≥ 1− β/2;
condition on this event.
By a tail bound on the Laplace mechanism (Lemma 3), with probability at least 1− γ, a noisy
loss ℓˆti satisfies ∣∣∣ℓˆti − (1/2)ℓti∣∣∣ ≤ ∆∞ǫ′ · log
(
1
γ
)
.
Taking a union bound over all T steps and d losses, this is true for all losses with probability at
least 1− β/2; condition on this event.
We first show that if these errors are small, then the theorem holds. Assume
2∆∞
ǫ′
· log
(
m
γ
)
≤ α
6
, (1)
so that both right hand sides above are at most α/6. Since α < 1, this implies that every Laplace
noise is at most 1, so the noisy losses are bounded: |ℓˆti| ≤ 1.
Let x∗ be an exactly feasible point, with ℓ1 norm 1. By the regret guarantee for multiplicative
weights (Theorem 27),
1
T
∑
t
ℓˆt · x˜t ≤ 1
T
∑
t
ℓˆt · x∗ + η + log d
ηT
1
T
∑
t
(
Apt
2
+
ν
2
)
· x˜t − bpt
2
=
1
T
∑
t
ℓˆt · x˜t − bpt
2
≤ 1
T
∑
t
ℓˆt · x∗ − bpt
2
+ η +
log d
ηT
,
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where ν is a vector of independent draws from Lap(∆∞/ǫ
′). Let i be any constraint. Since we
assumed the error of the exponential mechanism to be small (Equation (1)) and x˜t is a distribution,
1
T
∑
t
(
1
2
Ai · x˜t − bi
2
)
+
1
2
ν ≤ 1
T
∑
t
ℓˆt · x∗ − bpt
2
+ η +
log d
ηT
+
α
6
.
By assumption (Equation (1)) |ν| ≤ α/6, so
1
T
∑
t
Ai · x˜t − bi ≤ 1
T
∑
t
2ℓˆt · x∗ − bpt + α/3 + α/6 + η +
log d
ηT
.
Since x∗ is a feasible point, Ai ·x∗−bi ≤ 0 for all i. By assumption (Equation (1)),
∣∣∣Ai − 2ℓˆti∣∣∣ ≤ α/3.
By our choice of η and T ,
Ai · x− bi ≤ 1
T
∑
t
Ai · x∗ − bi + α/3 + α/3 + α/6 + η + log d
ηT
≤ 5α
6
+ η +
log d
ηT
≤ α,
as desired.
Now, it only remains to show Equation (1). By unfolding definitions like before, it suffices to
take
α ≥ 12∆
1/2
∞ d1/4(log d)1/4(log(1/δ))1/4
ǫ1/2
·
(
log
288d log dm
α2β
)1/2
.
4.4 Column Private LPs
Rather than an entire row changing, neighboring LPs may differ in a column; that is, they differ in
coefficients corresponding to a single variable. Roughly, a private database D maps to an objective
vector c(D), a constraint matrix A(D), and a vector b(D). For every pair of neighboring databases
D,D′, we have c(D) = c(D′) and b(D) = b(D′) independent of the data, and ‖A(D)i−A(D′)i‖∞ ≤
∆1 for every row i of the constraint matrix. Again, we will think of ∆1 as decreasing in n; our
accuracy guarantees will be trivial if this is not true. Formally:
Definition 29. A randomized algorithmM with inputs vector b ∈ Rm and matrix A ∈ Rm×d, and
outputting a vector in Rd is (ǫ, δ)-low sensitivity column private with sensitivity ∆1 if for any A,A
′
such that ‖Ai −A′i‖∞ ≤ ∆1 for each row i ∈ [m],
Pr[M(b,A) ∈ S] ≤ eǫ Pr[M(b′, A′) ∈ S] + δ
for any set S ⊆ Rd.
We can use a very slight modification of Algorithm 5 to solve these LPs privately; the algorithm
is given in Algorithm 6.
Like before, we can show that the exponential mechanism can be used as a private dual oracle.
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Algorithm 6 Column private LP solver
Input A ∈ [−1, 1]m×d, b ∈ Rm.
Let x˜1 be the uniform distribution in Rd, α > 0 be the desired accuracy, and ∆1 be the sensitivity.
Let Oracle be an (α, γ)-dual oracle, and set
T =
144 log d
α2
, ǫ′ =
ǫ
4
√
T log(1/δ)
, η =
√
log d
T
.
For t = 1, . . . , T :
Find pt = Oracle(A, b, x˜t).
Compute private losses ℓˆti :=
Apti+Lap
(
∆1
ǫ′
)
2 .
For each i, update xt+1i = e
−ηℓˆti · x˜ti.
Normalize x˜t+1 = xt+1/|xt+1|.
Output x = (1/T )
∑T
t=1 x˜
t.
Lemma 30. Let ǫ, γ > 0 be given, and suppose neighboring matrices A,A′ satisfy ‖Ai−A′i‖1 ≤ ∆1
for every row i. Let x be any distribution. Then, the ǫ-private exponential mechanism with quality
score
Q(i, b) = Aix− bi
is an (α, γ)-dual oracle, for
α =
2∆1
ǫ
· log
(
m
γ
)
.
Proof. Since x is a distribution, the quality score is ∆1-sensitive and accuracy follows from accuracy
of the exponential mechanism (Theorem 5).
Theorem 31. Let ǫ, ǫ′, δ,∆1 be as in Algorithm 6. Algorithm 6 run with an ǫ
′-private dual oracle
is (ǫ, δ)-low sensitiivty column private with sensitivity ∆1.
Proof. Since the loss vector ℓt can differ by at most ∆1 in ℓ1 norm, adding Laplace noise with scale
∆1/ǫ suffices for ǫ-differentially privacy. Thus, there are T Laplace and oracle mechanism steps,
each ǫ′-private. By choice of ǫ′ and composition, Algorithm 6 is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private.
Theorem 32. Let β > 0. Suppose the program has a distribution as a feasible solution. Then, with
probability at least 1 − β, Algorithm 6 run with the exponential mechanism (Lemma 30) as oracle
finds a point x∗ such that Ax∗ ≤ b+ α · 1, where
α = O˜
(
∆
1/2
1
ǫ1/2
· polylog
(
d,m,
1
β
,
1
δ
))
.
Proof. Let ǫ′ be as in Theorem 31, T be as inAlgorithm 6, and γ = β/2dT . Letting the dual oracle
by the ǫ′-private exponential mechanism, the proof is nearly identical to Theorem 28. The main
difference is that we need
2∆1
ǫ′
· log
(
1
γ
)
≤ α
6
22
for everything to go through. By unfolding definitions, it suffices to take
α ≥ 12∆
1/2
1 (log d)
1/4(log(1/δ))1/4
ǫ1/2
·
(
log
288m log d
α2β
)1/2
.
Comparing the two previous algorithms, note ∆∞ ≤ ∆1 ≤ d∆∞. Algorithm 5 performs better
when the right inequality is tighter, i.e., when all the coefficients in a row can differ by a small
amount. In contrast, Algorithm 6 performs better when the left inequality is tighter, that is, when
a few coefficients in a row can differ by a larger amount.
4.5 Objective Private LPs
For our final type of low-sensitivity LP, we consider linear programs with objectives that depend on
private data. We show that a very simple approach—randomized response—can solve these types
of LPs accurately. Throughout, we will assume that the optimal solution to the LP has ℓ1 weight
equal to 1. We start with an LP in general form:
max c⊤x
s.t. Ax ≤ b,
On instances corresponding to neighboring database D,D′, the objective may change by ∆1 in ℓ1
norm: ‖c(D)− c(D′)‖1 ≤ ∆1. Formally:
Definition 33. A randomized algorithm M with inputs vectors b ∈ Rm, c ∈ Rd and matrix
A ∈ Rm×d, and outputting a vector in Rd is (ǫ, δ)-low sensitivity objective private with sensitivity
∆1 if for any c, c
′ such that ‖c− c′‖1 ≤ ∆1,
Pr[M(c, b, A) ∈ S] ≤ eǫ Pr[M(c′, b, A) ∈ S] + δ
for any set S ⊆ Rd.
For a concrete case, a single objective coefficient may change by ∆1. All other parts of the LP
do not change: A(D) = A(D′), and b(D) = b(D′). If we add Laplace noise to the objective and
solve the resulting LP, we will get an almost optimal, exactly feasible solution.
Theorem 34. Suppose an objective private LP has optimal objective OPT, and has optimal solution
with ℓ1 weight 1. Define
cˆ = c+ Lap
(
∆1
√
8d log(1/δ)
ǫ
)d
,
where the noise is d independent draws from the Laplace distribution with the given parameter.
Then, releasing the perturbed LP
max cˆ⊤x
s.t. Ax ≤ b and 1⊤x = 1
is (ǫ, δ)-low sensitivity objective private with sensitivity ∆1. With probability 1 − β, solving the
perturbed LP non-privately yields a point x∗ such that Ax∗ ≤ b and c⊤x∗ ≥ OPT−α, where
α =
4∆1
√
8d log(d/δ)
ǫ
.
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Proof. Since the ℓ1 sensitivity of c is 1 and d numbers are released, (ǫ, δ)-privacy follows from the
composition theorem (Theorem 6).6
For the accuracy, note that with probability at least 1 − β/d, a single draw of the Laplace
distribution is bounded by
α
2
=
2∆1
√
8d log(d/δ)
ǫ
.
By a union bound, this happens with probability at least 1 − β for all d draws; condition on this
event. Then, note that if x∗ is the optimal solution to the original LP, then it is also a feasible
solution to the perturbed LP. Let xˆ∗ be the optimal solution of the perturbed LP. Since the noise
added to each objective coefficient is bounded by α/2, if
c⊤xˆ∗ < OPT−α
then
cˆ⊤xˆ∗ < OPT−α/2 but also cˆ⊤x∗ ≥ OPT−α/2,
contradicting optimality of xˆ∗ in the perturbed program. Thus, this algorithm finds an exactly
feasible, α-optimal solution.
5 Lower Bounds
Now that we have considered various low-sensitivity LPs, let us turn to high-sensitivity LPs. In this
section, we show that most high-sensitivity LPs cannot be solved privately to non-trivial accuracy.
The exception is constraint private LPs—as we saw (Section 3), these can be solved in a relaxed
sense. Our lower bounds are all reductions to reconstruction attacks: as the following theorem
shows, differential privacy precludes reconstructing a non-trivial fraction of a database. The idea of
reconstruction being a key feature of privacy violation is due to Dinur and Nissim [7]. The following
theorem is folklore; we provide a proof for completeness.
Theorem 35. Let mechanism M : {0, 1}n → [0, 1]n be (ǫ, δ)-differentially private, and suppose
that for all database D, with probability at least 1− β, ‖M(D)−D‖1 ≤ αn. Then,
α ≥ 1
2
− e
ǫ + δ
2(1 + eǫ)(1− β) := c(ǫ, δ, β).
The same is true even if D is restricted to have exactly n/2 zero entries.
Proof. If we have M as in the hypothesis, then we can round each entry of M(D) to {0, 1} while
preserving (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy. Note that by assumption ‖M(D)−D‖1 ≤ αn, so the number
of entriesM(D)i that are more than 1/2 away from Di is at most 2αn. Thus, rounding reconstructs
a database in {0, 1}n at most 2αn distance from the true database in ℓ1 norm; hence we may assume
that M(D) ∈ {0, 1}n with ℓ1 norm at most 2αn from D.
Assume n is even; we prove the case where the input database D has exactly n/2 zero entries.
Let D ∈ {0, 1}n have exactly n/2 zero entries, and sample an index i such that Di = 1, and an
index j such that Dj = 0, both uniformly at random from [n]. Let D
′ be identical to D except
with bits i and j swapped. By assumption, we have that with probability at least 1− β
‖M(D) −D‖1 ≤ 2αn and ‖M(D′)−D′‖1 ≤ 2αn.
6This is similar to the case of privately releasing histogram queries.
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Since i is chosen uniformly, we also know
Pr[M(D)i = Di] ≥ (1− 2α)(1 − β) and Pr[M(D′)i = D′i] ≥ (1− 2α)(1 − β).
Hence, Pr[M(D′)i = Di] ≤ 1− (1− 2α)(1 − β) because Di 6= D′i. By (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy, we
get
(1− 2α)(1 − β) ≤ Pr[M(D)i = Di] ≤ eǫ Pr[M(D′)i = Di] + δ ≤ eǫ(1− (1− 2α)(1 − β)) + δ.
Finally,
1− 2α ≤ e
ǫ + δ
(1 + eǫ)(1 − β) ,
as desired.
For each type of impossible private LP, we show how to convert a database D ∈ {0, 1}n to
a LP, such that neighboring databases D,D′ lead to neighboring LPs. We then show that a LP
solver that privately solves this LP to non-trivial accuracy leads to a reconstruction attack on D,
violating Theorem 35.
First, some notation. For the general LP
max c⊤x
s.t. Ax ≤ b,
we say that x∗ is an α-feasible solution if Ax∗ ≤ b+α · 1. Likewise, we say that x∗ is an α-optimal
solution if it is feasible, and
c⊤x∗ ≥ max
x:Ax≤b
c⊤x− α.
5.1 High-Sensitivity Scalars
Consider a database D ∈ {0, 1}n, and the following LP:
find x
s.t. xi = Di for each i
Note that changing a single bit in D will change a single right hand side in a constraint by 1.
Theorem 36. Suppose mechanism M is (ǫ, δ)-high sensitivity scalar private, and with probability
at least 1− β, finds an α-feasible solution. Then, α ≥ 1/2.
Proof. Consider the gadget LP above. Note that if M guarantees α < 1/2, then |xi −Di| < 1/2
so rounding xi to 0 or 1 will reconstruct Di exactly. By Theorem 35, this is impossible under
differential privacy.
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5.2 High-Sensitivity Objective
Consider a database D ∈ {0, 1}n with exactly n/2 zeros, and the following LP:
maximize
∑
i
Dixi − n/2
s.t.
∑
i
xi = n/2, xi ∈ [0, 1]
Note that swapping a zero and a non-zero bit in D will change exactly two objective coefficients
in the LP by 1. Observe that this is similar to the objective private LP (Section 4.5) because we
are only allowing the objective to change. However here we consider the setting where a single
objective coefficient changes arbitrarily, rather than by a small amount.
Theorem 37. Suppose mechanism M is (ǫ, δ)-high-sensitivity objective private, and with probabil-
ity at least 1 − β, finds an exactly feasible, additive (αn)-optimal solution. Then, α ≥ c(2ǫ, δ(1 +
eǫ), β).
Proof. Consider the gadget LP above. Note that the optimal solution is xi = Di, with objective 0.
With probability at least 1−β,M finds a solution x∗ with objective at least −αn. In this case, x∗
places at most αn mass on indices with Di = 0, so at least (1− α)n mass of D and x∗ are shared.
Thus,
‖D − x∗‖1 ≤ αn.
Since a change in D leads to a distance two change in the LP, the composition is (2ǫ, δ(1 + eǫ))-
private. By Theorem 35, α ≥ c(2ǫ, δ(1 + eǫ), β).
5.3 High-Sensitivity Constraints/Columns
Consider a database D ∈ {0, 1}n with exactly n/2 zeros, and the following LP:
find xi
s.t.
∑
i
Dixi = n/2
xi ∈ [0, 1] and
∑
i
xi = n/2
Note that changing a single bit in D will change coefficients in a single constraint in the LP by
1. Observe that this is similar to the column private LP (Section 4.4) because we are allowing
the coefficients for a single variable to change. However here we consider the setting where this
coefficient can change arbitrarily, rather than by only a small amount.
This problem is also a special case of constraint private LPs (Section 3) because the coefficients
in one (i.e., the only) constraint can change arbitrarily. In the current setting, we want a solution
that approximately satisfies all constraints, rather than just satisfying most of the constraints.
Theorem 38. Suppose mechanism M is (ǫ, δ)-high-sensitivity constraint private, and finds an
α-feasible solution that satisfies all public constraints with probability at least 1 − β. Then, α ≥
c(2ǫ, δ(1 + eǫ), β).
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Proof. Consider the gadget LP above. Suppose with probability 1 − β, M finds x∗ such that
‖Ax∗ − b‖∞ ≤ α for the gadget LP. By reasoning analogous to Theorem 37, at least (1 − α)n of
the mass of x∗ will coincide with D, hence α ≥ c(2ǫ, δ(1 + eǫ), β) by Theorem 35.
Also note that the LPs produced by this reduction differ only in the coefficients corresponding
to two variables. Hence, Theorem 38 also shows that privately solving column private LPs to non-
trivial accuracy is impossible. It’s possible that a relaxed solution, similar to allowing unsatisfied
constraints in the constraint-private case, could be possible under column privacy.
However, it is not enough to allow some constraints to be unsatisfied. Since we can simply
duplicate the constraint in our lower bound gadget multiple times, producing a solution satisfying
any single constraint to non-trivial accuracy is impossible under high-sensitivity column privacy.
A different relaxation would be needed for non-trivial accuracy under column privacy.
6 Discussion
In this paper, we have initiated the study of privately solving general linear programs. We have
given a taxonomy of private linear programs, classified by how the private data affects the LP. For
each type of linear program in the taxonomy, we have either given an efficient algorithm, or an
impossibility result.
One natural question is, to what extent do our results extend to other private convex programs,
e.g., semidefinite programs (SDPs)? A tempting approach is to to use the Matrix Multiplicative
Weights algorithm of Arora and Kale [1] for solving SDPs. However, certain features of the stan-
dard multiplicative weights algorithm which we use crucially—such as compatibility with Bregman
projections—seem more delicate when using Matrix Multiplicative Weights.
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